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Current psychometric models of choice behavior are strongly inﬂuenced by Thurstone’s (1927,
1931) experimental and statistical work on measuring and scaling preferences. Aided by advances in
computational techniques, choice models can now accommodate a wide range of different data types and
sources of preference variability among respondents induced by such diverse factors as person-speciﬁc
choice sets or different functional forms for the underlying utility representations. At the same time,
these models are increasingly challenged by behavioral work demonstrating the prevalence of choice
behavior that is not consistent with the underlying assumptions of these models. I discuss new modeling
avenuesthatcanaccountforsuchseeminglyinconsistentchoicebehaviorandconcludebyemphasizingthe
interdisciplinaryfrontiersinthestudyofchoicebehaviorandtheresultingchallengesforpsychometricians.
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Introduction
Most psychometric models for the analysis of multivariate discrete choice data are based on
the assumption that choices among options are determined by their underlying utilities for the
decision-makers. Because of signiﬁcant computational advances in estimating the parameters of
the latent utility distribution, the analysis of multivariate choice data is now well on its way of
becoming a routine matter (B¨ ockenholt & Tsai, 2006; Caffo & Griswold, 2006). Even the joint
modeling of discrete and continuous choice outcomes is starting to be commonplace (Hanemann,
1984; Gueorguieva & Agresti, 2001). It is therefore appropriate to revisit this methodology and
to assess its past, current, and future value in modeling choice data.
Because this paper reﬂects my personal journey and views on the analysis of choice data,
many important subjects as well as contributors are left out, for which I apologize. In particular,
this paper will not get into the extensive literature on estimation and inference—careful discus-
sionsofthesetopicscanbefoundinthebooksbyHensher,Rose,andGreene(2005),Train(2003),
and Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000). The papers presented at the 2004 Invitational Choice
Symposium (Chakravarti, Sinha, & Kim, 2005) provide valuable overviews of many interesting
topics in modeling choice behavior. In addition, the addresses of two nobel prize laureates in
economics (Kahneman, 2003; McFadden, 2001) contain excellent reviews of this ﬁeld.
My journey is linked to two papers by Thurstone (1927, 1931) that started the era of
psychometric choice modeling. The next section will brieﬂy review the contributions of these
papers,whichisfollowedbyadiscussionofcurrentversionsofThurstonian-basedchoicemodels.
Subsequently, I will point to new research avenues in extending these models to account for
seemingly inconsistent choice behavior. The paper concludes by pointing to the interdisciplinary
frontiers of studying choice behavior and the resulting future challenges for psychometricians.
The author would like to thank R. Darrell Bock whose work inspired many of the ideas presented here. The paper
beneﬁttedfromhelpfulcommentsbyAlbertMaydeu-OlivaresandRung-ChingTsai.Thereportedresearchwassupported
in parts by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Utility Theories and Choice Data
Most psychometric choice models are based on the notion of decision utility. This approach
infers utility from observed choices and in turn uses utility to explain choices. For example, if a
person chooses a and rejects b, this behavior is interpreted as indicating that a has a higher utility
than b to this person. A number of consistency conditions have been proposed in the literature to
characterizechoicesbasedondecisionutilities.Transitivityisawell-knownconsistencycondition
stating that a preference for a over b and b over c implies a preference for a over c.
Inpsychometrics,Thurstone’s(1927,1931)workprovedtobehighlyinﬂuentialinpromoting
an extended version of the decision-utility concept that allowed for stochastic variability in
choices. Invoking Fechner’s (1860) psychophysical concept of a sensory continuum, Thurstone
(1927) argued in his “Law of Comparative Judgment” that choice options can be represented
along a utility continuum by random variables that describe the options’ effects on a person’s
cognitive apparatus. Thurstone used randomness as a device to represent factors that determine
the formation of preferences but are unknown to the observer. This speciﬁcation was driven by
pragmatic considerations since Thurstone was well aware that he could not distinguish between
the positions of whether a choice process is inherently random or determined by a multitude
of different factors that may not be measurable. By not specifying the “discriminal” process
by which a person “identiﬁes, distinguishes, discriminates, or reacts to stimuli” (1927, p. 369)
and deﬁning it to be exogenous to all the factors that can affect a choice process, he broadened
tremendously the applicability of this approach to the modeling of choice data. Importantly, he
also utilized these ideas for modeling individual differences in choice behavior by arguing that
heterogeneity in individual assessments of the same option can be described as realizations of
the normal distribution. Introducing Thurstone’s work to economics, Marschak (1960) coined
the term Random Utility Maximization (RUM) when referring to choice probabilities that result
from the maximization of utilities with random elements.
Not unlike the notion of personality traits, a controversial corollary of decision utility is that
the measured utilities are predetermined, decomposable, and stable over both time and across
situations.Consistencyconditionsdeﬁnedforstochasticpreferencesincludestochastictransitivity
and contraction and expansion consistency (Block & Marschak, 1960; Falmagne, 1985). Under
contraction consistency, if a choice set T is narrowed to U and the options chosen from T are still
in U, then no unchosen options should be chosen and no previously chosen options should be
unchosen. Under expansion consistency, if a choice set T is expanded to U, then the probability
of choosing an option from U should not exceed the probability of choosing the same option
from T.
In addition to providing a probabilistic version of decision utility, Thurstone (1931) also
promoted the beneﬁts of experimental methods in collecting choice data. By asking respondents
tostatedirectlytheirpreferencesforasingleormultiplesetsofoptionsincontrolledexperimental
settings, he showed that it is possible to obtain information about a person’s preferences that may
not be available by observing choices in the person’s daily context. These two data types became
known later as “stated preference” and “revealed preference” data.
Thurstone (1931) showed that stated preference data can be used to test for indifference
curves which at that time played a pivotal role in consumer demand theory. Initially, economists
conceptualized the unit of utility as the “just perceivable increment of pleasure” (Edgeworth,
1881, p. 99) but moved later towards the concept of decision utility and, in this context, adopted
Pareto’s (1900) work on indifference curves that depict different bundle combinations a person
is indifferent to choose among. Interestingly, Thurstone’s (1931) experimental investigation of
indifference curves was met initially with severe criticism by economists (Georgescu-Roegen,
1936; Wallis & Friedman, 1942) and had little impact on subsequent developments of demand
theory.Reasonsforthenegativereactionsincludedthehypotheticalnatureofthechoicesituation,ULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 617
the apparent empirical difﬁculties in detecting indifference, and the experimental lack of control
for the effect of income and prices. Looking back, however, Thurstone’s (1931) study was rather
signiﬁcant because it is the ﬁrst reported experiment in behavioral economics, and also prompted
much future work on conjoint measurement and related methods (Luce & Tukey, 1964).
Thurstone’s contributions to experimental paradigms for collecting choice data and to the
psychometric foundation of choice models with latent variables, in combination with parallel
developments in biometrics, sociometrics, and econometrics, led to a rich set of choice models
(Ashford & Sowdon, 1970; McFadden, 1984; Hausman & Wise, 1978). The next section presents
a short discussion of these Thurstonian-based models for stated preference data and also points
to related developments.
Thurstonian Random Utility Models
Typically, stated choice data are collected in the form of incomplete and/or partial rankings.
Incompleterankingdataareobtainedwhenadecision-makerconsidersonlyasubsetofthechoice
options. For example, in the method of paired comparison, two choice options are presented at a
time, and the decision-maker is asked to select the more preferred one (David, 1988). In contrast,
in a partial ranking task, a decision-maker is confronted with all choice options and asked to
provide a ranking for a subset of the options. For instance, in the best–worst method, a decision-
maker is instructed to select the best and worst options out of the offered set of choice options.
Both partial and incomplete approaches can be combined by offering multiple distinct subsets
of the choice options and obtaining partial or complete rankings for each of them. Pick any
constant-sum, and ordinal versions of paired comparison and rankings are alternative methods
for collecting stated preference data (B¨ ockenholt, 1992, 2001a, 2001b; B¨ ockenholt & Dillon,
1997a; Yao & B¨ ockenholt, 1999).
The Response Model
ConsiderasetofJ choicealternatives(j = 1,...,J)andndecision-makers(i = 1,...,n).
Under Thurstone’s (1927) random utility approach, a choice of an option j is determined by an
unobserved utility assessment, υj, that can be decomposed into a systematic and a random part:
υj = µ µj +  j, (1)
where the option mean µ µj is assumed to stay the same in repeated evaluations of the option, but
the random contribution  j varies from evaluation to evaluation according to some distribution.
The stochastic component represents unobserved attributes affecting choice, interindividual dif-
ferences in the utility assessments, measurement errors, and functional misspeciﬁcation (Manski,
1977). Clearly, this decomposition is fragile and not easy to perform in empirical applications,
especially involving revealed choice data. Initially, (1) was applied to the analysis of paired com-
parison data obtained from a group of judges who were asked to choose their preferred option
for all possible pairs of stimuli. Bock (1958) noted that in this case a two-level representation is
needed and extended (1) to include person-speciﬁc effects:
υij = µ µij +  ij, (2)
where µ µij represents person’s i mean evaluation of option j. Takane (1987) further extended this
work by presenting a general class of covariance structures to represent individual differences in
the assessments of the choice options.
In general, the choices made by person i for a single choice set of J options can be
summarized by an ordering vector ri. For instance, ri = (h,j,...,l,k) indicates that choice618 PSYCHOMETRIKA
option h is judged superior to option j which in turn is judged superior to the remaining options,
with the least preferred option being k. The probability of observing this ordering vector for
person i can be written as
Pr(ri = (h,j,...,l,k)) = Pr[(υih − υij > 0) ∩···∩(υil − υik > 0)]. (3)
More compactly, a (J − 1) × J contrast matrix, Ci, can be deﬁned to indicate the sign of the
differences among the ranked options. For example, for the ordering vectors ri = (j,l,k)o f
J = 3, the corresponding contrast matrix takes on the form
Ci =
 
10 −1
0 −11
 
,
where the three columns of the contrast matrix correspond to the options j, k, and l, respectively.
The distributional assumptions on the  ij’s determine the probability for each response
pattern.Forexample,amultivariateprobitmodelisobtainedwhenassumingthatlatentjudgments
υi = (υi1,...,υ iJ)o ft h eJ options for judge i are multivariate normal with mean vector µ µi and
covariance matrix  . Ansari and Iyengar (in press) proposed a more general random-effects
representation by specifying the  ij’s semiparametrically using Dirichlet process priors. In the
following, the popular normality representation is adopted for ease of presentation. In this case,
the probability of observing the ordering vector ri is obtained by evaluating a (J − 1)-variate
normal distribution,
Pr(ri|µ µi, ) =
| i|−1/2
(2π)(J−1)/2
  ∞
0
...
  ∞
0
exp
 
−
1
2
(x − δi)  
−1
i (x − δi)
 
dx, (4)
where δi = Ci µ µi and  i = Ci C 
i.
Typically, choice options are presented to judges in multiple blocks, especially when the set
of choice options is large. This approach simpliﬁes the judgmental task since only a few options
need to be considered at a time. It also facilitates studying whether judges are consistent in their
evaluations of the choice options. Consider, for example, a paired comparison task in which a
person is asked to choose the preferred option for a subset or all of the pairwise choice sets.
Extending (2), the utilities of judge i that underlie the pairwise comparison of options j and k,
respectively, can be written as
υij(k) = µ µij +  ij(k),
υik(j) = µ µik +  ik(j).
(5)
The terms  j(k) and  k(j) capture random variations in the judgmental process, where  j(k) denotes
the random variation of option j when compared to option k. Thus, according to (3), the choice
between j and k is determined by the sign of the latent judgment yijk where
yijk = υij(k) − υik(j) = µ µij − µ µik +  ij(k) −  ik(j). (6)
It can be either assumed that judgments across choice sets are independent or dependent on
the individual level. Under independence, one obtains
yijk = µ µij − µ µik +  ijk, (7)
where  ijk =  ij(k) −  ik(j) and the variability in the judgments comes solely from the  ’s which
are independently distributed given the person-speciﬁc parameters. For multiple comparisons of
J options, the latent pairwise judgments of judge i can then be written conveniently as a linearULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 619
model. For example, in a comparison of the options j, k, l, and m, we obtain
yi =
⎛
⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
yijk
yijl
yijm
yikl
yikm
yilm
⎞
⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
=
⎛
⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
1 −100
10 −10
100 −1
01 −10
010 −1
001 −1
⎞
⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
µ µij
µ µik
µ µil
µ µim
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
+
⎛
⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
 ijk
 ijl
 ijm
 ikl
 ikm
 ilm
⎞
⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
= Aµ µi +  i, (8)
where A is the paired-comparison design matrix.
There are important links between multivariate, non-linear mixed IRT models for nominal
and binomial responses and random-utility models (Rijmen, Tuerlinckx, De Boeck, & Kuppens,
2003).Manyofthesemodelsarebasedonrandom-effectsversionsofLuce’s(1959)choicemodel
which is consistent with a RUM model if and only if the random component in (2) follows a
Gumbel distribution (Holman & Marley reported in Luce & Suppes, 1965). Examples include
Bock’s (1969, 1972) multinomial logit and nominal models, McFadden’s (1974) conditional
logit model, McFadden and Train’s (2000) mixed multinomial logit model, B¨ ockenholt’s (2001b)
ranking model, and Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh’s (2003) multilevel logit model.
The interpretation of the RUM model parameters is limited by the comparative and discrete
nature of choice data. Most importantly, it is not possible to identify the origin and scale of the
individual utility scales. One option may be preferred to another but this result does not allow any
conclusions about the attractiveness level of the options or about interpersonal differences in the
utilities (Guttman, 1946). Tsai (2000, 2003) discusses the identiﬁability of parameter estimates
for Thurstonian ranking and paired comparison models (see also Tsai & B¨ ockenholt, 2002). An
important implication of this work is that the Case distinctions that were originally proposed by
Thurstone (1927) are misleading and have to be interpreted as equivalence classes of covariance
structures. However, as noted already by Thurstone and Jones (1957), it is possible to identify the
origin of the utility scale by extending the choice task, for example, by including comparisons
between pairs of options. B¨ ockenholt (2004) provides a recent review and discussion of different
methodsthatcanbeusedforthispurpose.Ingeneral,methodsforidentifyinganutilityscaleorigin
arenot onlyinstrumentalforavoiding difﬁcultiesintheinterpretationoftheestimatedparameters
of a choice model, they also provide useful insights about the underlying judgmental process.
Current Uses of Thurstonian Random Utility Models
This section discusses three major current psychometric research streams in the analysis of
choice data. First, much work is underway to enhance our current tool set for modeling individual
differencesbothataparticularpointintimeandovertime.Second,thereisstronginterestingoing
beyond modeling the relationship between choice options and decision-makers and to consider a
wider range of inﬂuences including social context and social inﬂuences. A third research stream
focusses on ways to supplement and complement choice data because choice outcomes alone
provide only limited information about the choice process and its determinants.
Individual Differences
The analysis of individual difference effects is one of most fruitful aspects of Thurstonian
random utility models. Past work considered nested and crossed random effects, person-speciﬁc
regression weights, and factor structures to capture dependencies among options under ﬂexible
distributional assumptions that include mixtures of the extreme value distribution, multivariate620 PSYCHOMETRIKA
normality, scale mixtures of multivariate normal distributions, and Dirchlet processes. For ex-
ample, the following decomposition of an individual utility vector allows for the effects of
judge-speciﬁc covariates xi as well as observed and unobserved attributes of the options, given
by M and  , respectively,
µ µi = µ µ + Kxi + Mβi +   f i + νi, (9)
where K, βi, and f i contain regression coefﬁcients. Effects that are not accounted for by the
covariates are represented by νi. Under normality assumptions, νi ∼ N(0, ν), βi ∼ N(β, β),
and f i ∼ N(0, f).Althoughtheinterpretationofindividualtastedifferencesismuchsimpliﬁed
under the assumption that decision-makers use the same set of attributes in assessing the choice
options,somecaremustbetakeninrelatingtheseattributestotheoptionutilities.Forexample,an
ideal-point model may prove superior to the linear representation provided by the factor-analytic
model in (9) if individuals choose the option that is closest to their “ideal” or most preferred
option (B¨ ockenholt, 1998; Coombs 1964; MacKay, Easley, & Zinnes, 1995). Applications of
ranking and paired comparison models with unobserved attributes are reported by Brady (1989),
Chan and Bentler (1998), Maydeu-Olivares and B¨ ockenholt (2005), Takane (1987), Tsai and
B¨ ockenholt (2001), and Yu, Lam, and Lo (1998). Examining preferences for multi-attributed
options, conjoint analysis (Bock & Jones, 1968; Marshall & Bradlow, 2002) uses (9) for the
development of new products with optimal combinations of attributes.
Whenpreferencesforonlyasinglechoicesetareelicited,theeffectsofbetween-andwithin-
judge variability are confounded. For example, if judges are asked to rank J options only once,
it is not possible to identify separately the effects of  ij and µ µij in (2). Fortunately, with multiple
choice sets or when choices are observed over time, it becomes possible to distinguish explicitly
these sources of variability. Speciﬁcally, in the context of time-dependent choices, parameter-
driven dynamic approaches have proven useful to capture dependencies on the within- and
between-subject levels (B¨ ockenholt, 2002; Allenby & Lenk, 1994). For example, in the context
of modeling voting data collected before and after the 1992 presidential election, B¨ ockenholt
(2002) applied the following vector-autoregressive model with
µ µit = ϒµ µi,t−1 + ξ ξit, (10)
where µ µit are the options’ mean evaluations of person i at time t, and the (J × J) coefﬁcient
matrix ϒ contains the multivariate regression effects between the evaluations of the options at
two adjacent time points. The diagonal elements of ϒ contain each option’s autoregressive term
and the off-diagonal elements contain the lagged effects of the J − 1 remaining random utilities.
The J-dimensional random effect ξ ξit captures the part of µ µit that cannot be predicted on the basis
of past evaluations of the options. There are many interesting variations on studying temporal
effects on choice including time-continuous models choice (B¨ ockenholt, 2005) and latent change
models (B¨ ockenholt & Dillon, 1997b).
Asidefromtemporaldependencies,thereisalsostronginterestinmodelingproximity–based
dependencies that are introduced by known or unknown (latent) relationships among individuals
(Anselin, 2002; Bradlow et al., 2005). This work goes beyond the standard assumption that
individuals make choices in isolation by allowing explicitly for the possibility that choices of
individuals are correlated or inﬂuenced by each other.
Social Dependencies
During the last decade the study of the effect of social interactions on choice has become an
importantareaofresearch.Althoughithaslongbeenrecognized(e.g.,Veblen,1899;Leibenstein,
1950) that choices of individuals may depend on the choice behavior of their social network,
empirical research on this topic has been slow, mainly, because of methodological problemsULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 621
(Manski, 2000; Brock & Durlauf, 2001). Modeling issues that need to be addressed in empirical
work on social interactions are:
(a) the identiﬁcation of the reference group for which social interaction effects are sought to
be established;
(b) self-selection processes of peer or group members;
(c) controls for correlated effects that affect all group members in a similar way; and
(d) controls for contextual effects such as exogenous social background characteristics of
group members.
Because these issues are difﬁcult to tackle in any observational study, progress is most likely
to be made by combining observational with quasi-experimental or laboratory studies.
A basic version of an interaction-based model is obtained by extending (2) to include the
inﬂuence of the choice behavior of others (Soetevent & Kooreman, 2007).
υij = µ µij +  ij + λij, (11)
where λij = γw ij
 
k =i wkj and wij = 1 if option j is chosen by person i and −1, otherwise.
Thus, for γ>0, the utility of choosing option j when another person chooses the same option
as well is larger than the utility of choosing this option when it is not chosen by another person.
For γ = 0, the model reduces to the standard Thurstonian choice model. Even for the simple
model (11), with ﬁxed effects for the social interaction component, multiple equilibria exist that
complicate parameter estimation.
In general, the modeling of interaction structures has been based mainly on mathematical
models originating in the area of statistical mechanics (Yeomans, 1992). Although the physical
interpretation of these models may be of little interest to social scientists, their mathematical
properties are intriguing and deserve to be explored in experiments on social decision-making.
Beyond Choice Data
Because choice data contain little information about the underlying choice process and its
determinants, there have been many attempts both to supplement them by considering other data
sources such as reaction times or process-tracing data (B¨ ockenholt & Hynan, 1994; Johnson &
Busemeyer, 2005) and to complement them by combining revealed and stated preference data
(Ben-Akiva et al., 1997), or by collecting comparative judgment data on perceived attributes
of the choice options. Below I discuss examples of both approaches by considering risky and
multiattribute choices.
Uncertain Choice Outcomes
Many, if not most, real-life decisions are based on a mix of information and subjective
expectations about the choice options under consideration. For example, the selection of a job
may be based on a job description as well as on expectations about the career path. Purchases of
over-the-counterdrugsmaybeinﬂuencedbythedrugs’ingredientsbutalsobyexpectationsabout
the ingredients’ effectiveness and quality perceptions of the manufacturers. If these subjective
expectations are rational or well-calibrated, it is possible to infer both expectations and utilities
from choices alone. However, there is much evidence to suggest that this assumption is difﬁcult
to justify in general (see Kahneman, 2003, for a recent review). As a possible solution to this
dilemma, Manski (2004) proposed to measure separately expectations in the form of subjective
probabilities and combining them with the choice outcomes. Although much care needs to be
taken in the elicitation of subjective probabilities, this approach is likely to mitigate problems
arising from assuming that expectations are rational.622 PSYCHOMETRIKA
Consider option j with M outcomes (ej1,...,e jM). By specifying the utility function to be
additively separable in outcome and the outcomes to be binary, (2) can be extended to
υij =
M  
m=1
 
Pij(em = 1)µ µim(ej=1) + (1 − Pij(em = 1))µ µim(ej=0)
 
+  ij, (12)
where ij denotestheunsystematicresponsevariabilityintheevaluationofoptionj andPij(em =
1)isthesubjectiveprobabilitythatoutcomemoccurswhenoptionj isselected.Asimplerversion
of (12) was proposed by Shuford, Jones, and Bock (1960) who asked respondents to choose
between lotteries with known outcome values and probabilities (see also B¨ ockenholt, 2004).
Although (12) is a useful starting point for studies on decision-making under uncertainty, it may
require further extensions that take into account nonbinary outcomes and rank dependence in the
valuation of the option outcomes and their subjective probabilities (Luce, 2000). However, this
callforadditionalresearchshouldnotdistractfromtheobservationthatcombiningpreferencedata
with subjective probabilities is a promising avenue for psychometric analyses of decision-making
when only partial information about the choice options is available.
Multiattribute Choices
In many applications, it is useful to collect choice data with respect to several attributes to
understandhowtheyrelatetoeachother.Inthiscase,oneneedstodistinguishbetweentwosources
of response dependencies introduced by the comparison of the different options with respect to
the same attribute (within-attribute dependence), and by the evaluation of the same options on
different attributes (between-attribute dependence). B¨ ockenholt (1996) suggested the following
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the multivariate judgments (ria, rib,...,riq) with
respect to q attributes:
 µ µ =  C ⊗  O,
where  C represents the associations among the q attributes, and  O represents the associations
among the J options. For example, in the two-attribute case, when the covariance matrix of the
options is represented by an identity matrix, we obtain
 µ µ = (ρabI) ⊗ I =
  I ρabI
ρabII
 
,
and ρab is the correlation between the attributes a and b.
Future Uses of Thurstonian-Based Analyses
Paralleltotheseexpansionsofrandomutilitymodels,agrowingliteraturehasdevelopedover
the years that questions the descriptive value of RUMs. This work showed that the consideration
of unsystematic error in (2) is insufﬁcient to account for inconsistent choice behavior. Already
May (1954) presented convincing evidence that strategies for comparing alternatives can lead to
systematic violations of such internal consistency criteria as weak stochastic transitivity which is
deﬁned for the three options j, k, and l as
Pr(j   k) ≥ .50 and Pr(k   l) ≥ .50 ⇒ Pr(j   l) ≥ .50.
More generally, in the same way as the meaning of a word is clariﬁed by the context of the
sentence in which it appears, the valuation of a choice option seems to depend frequently on theULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 623
context of the choice set. The “asymmetric dominance” and the “compromise” effects are two
well-known examples of systematic violations of expansion consistency (Simonson & Tversky,
1992). In the asymmetric dominance case, the dominance relation between two options affects
their evaluations. This effect is not present when each of the options are presented in combination
with an option that is neither dominating or dominated. The compromise effect occurs when a
two-attribute option is presented as falling between two extreme options that are strong on one
but weak on the other attribute. In this case, the “compromise” option seems to receive a boost for
having medium values on both attributes. Such relational effects cannot be captured by models
that consider context-independent evaluations of choice options.
Shaﬁr and LeBoeuf (2002) review a long list of factors that have been shown to affect
decision processes as well as possible explanations that can account for these effects. This list
includes contextual effects (e.g., relational features such as dominance among choice options,
temporal features of the choice situation), choice processes (e.g., the evaluability of options,
decision strategies, information search strategies), presentation formats, frames, cultural and
social norms, as well as characteristics of the decision-maker (e.g., emotional state, general
intelligence, numeracy). In view of this list, it is perhaps surprising how well (2) can work in
providing satisfactory accounts of choice data.
Because of the experimental nature of studies investigating systematic violations of RUMs,
the literature contains only a few quantitative accounts on the degree to which observed choice
behavior is consistent or inconsistent with a random utility representation (Ryan, Netten, Skatun,
& Smith, 2006). This lack of information contributes to the ongoing controversy about the status
of RUM models—whether they should be abandoned or extended in speciﬁc ways to increase
their applicability. To resolve this debate, meta-analyses are needed but also new modeling
approaches that allow identifying factors that characterize consistent and inconsistent choosers.
For example, the π∗ model (Rudas, Clogg, & Lindsay, 1994) could be employed usefully by
including one mixture component based on (2) and a second one that captures deviations from
this model to estimate the proportion of judges whose choices are inconsistent with a random
utilityrepresentation.Alternatively,multiheuristicmixturemodelscouldbedevelopedwhereeach
mixture component represents a different choice heuristic (Mellers & Biagini, 1994; Gonzalez-
Vallejo, 2002; Wedel & Kamakura, 1999) that may lead to both consistent as well as inconsistent
choices. A third avenue towards a more descriptive account of choice behavior is to replace the
notion that utilities are predetermined and stable by a more dynamic view of utilities (Liechty,
Fong,&DeSarbo,2005).ThisapproachwastakenbyTsaiandB¨ ockenholt(2006)whointroduced
a more general framework for the analysis of pairwise judgments that does not require the two
assumptions of independent judgments on the individual level and ﬁxed utilities across choice
sets. Instead, they decomposed the latent judgments as
υij(k) = µ µij(k) +  ij(k),
υik(j) = µ µik(j) +  ik(j),
where  j(k) and µ µij(k) denote the random variation and person-speciﬁc evaluation of option j,
respectively, when compared to option k. As a result, (6) changes to
yijk = υij(k) − υik(j) = µ µij(k) − µ µik(j) +  ij(k) −  ik(j).
For multiple comparisons with J items, the paired comparison judgments can again be
written conveniently as a linear model. Let   = ( 1(2),  1(3), ...,  1(J),  2(1),  2(3), ...,  ,(J)(J−1))  be
aJ(J − 1)-dimensionalrandomvector,andlet B bea(
J
2) × J(J − 1)matrixwhereeachcolumn
of B corresponds to one of the (
J
2) paired comparisons and each row to one of the J(J − 1) terms624 PSYCHOMETRIKA
in  i . For example, when J = 3,   = ( 1(2),  1(3),  2(1),  2(3),  3(1),  3(2))  and
B =
⎛
⎜
⎝
10−1 000
01 00−10
00 01 0−1
⎞
⎟
⎠. (13)
For example, in a comparison of the items j, k, l, and m with context-free mean evaluations of
the choice options, we obtain
yi =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
yijk
yijl
yijm
yikl
yikm
yilm
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
=
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
1 −100
10 −10
100 −1
01 −10
010 −1
001 −1
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
µ µij
µ µik
µ µil
µ µim
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
+
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
 ij(k) −  ik(j)
 ij(l) −  il(j)
 ij(m) −  im(j)
 ik(l) −  il(k)
 ik(m) −  im(k)
 il(m) −  im(l)
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
= Aµ µi + B i,
(14)
where  i = ( ij(k),  ij(l),  ij(m),  ik(j),  ik(l),  ik(m),...,  im(j),  im(k),  im(l)) .
Decomposingµ µi = µ µ + νi andundermultivariatenormalityassumptionsfor i ∼ N(0,  ),
νi ∼ N(0, ν), and  i independent of νi, we obtain for the joint distribution of νi,  i, and yi,
⎡
⎢
⎣
νi
 i
yi
⎤
⎥
⎦ ∼ N
⎛
⎜
⎝
⎡
⎢
⎣
0J
0J(J−1)
Aµ µ
⎤
⎥
⎦,
⎡
⎢
⎣
 ν 0   ν A 
0      B 
A ν B    y
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎠, (15)
and  y = A ν A  + B  B .
The covariance matrix    can provide useful insights about the dependencies between the
options’ utilities over different choice sets. For example, a high covariance between the utilities
of option j across different option pairs indicates strong consistency in the choices involving this
option and hence a low incidence of intransitive choices. A parsimonious, and easy to interpret,
representation of    is obtained when decomposing it as
   =
J  
j=1
(Dj ⊗ Sj), (16)
where Dj is a J × J matrix with positive (j,j) element dj and zero otherwise, and Sj is a
(J − 1) × (J − 1) covariance matrix for option j.
Tversky’s (1969) Gambling Study
Tsai and B¨ ockenholt (2006) applied (16) in a replication of Tversky’s (1969) intransitivity
study. In this experiment, subjects were presented with four lotteries of the form ($x,p;0) where
the amount x can be won with probability p and nothing otherwise. The winning probabilities
of the four lotteries were 7
24, 8
24, 9
24, and 10
24 and the corresponding payoffs were $20, $19, $18,
and $17, respectively. The gambles were constructed in such a way that payoffs are negatively
correlated with expected values. Probabilities were presented in the form of difﬁcult-to-compare
pie sector diagrams, with the expectation that some participants would ignore small probability
differences and focus on the payoffs instead. For large differences between the probabilities,
it was expected that participants would consider probabilities in combination with the payoff
in their decision to select the more attractive lottery. To test this hypothesis formally, Tsai andULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 625
B¨ ockenholt (2006) speciﬁed the following covariance matrix for the lottery ($20, 7
24;0) when
compared to the other three lotteries:
Sa =
⎛
⎜
⎝
1 −τ −τ
−τ 1 τ
−ττ 1
⎞
⎟
⎠. (17)
Because of the expected shift in the decision strategy, evaluations of lottery ($20, 7
24;0) when
comparedtolottery($19, 8
24;0)wereexpectedtobenegativelycorrelated.Incontrast,evaluations
of lottery ($20, 7
24;0) when compared with lotteries ($18, 9
24;0) and ($17, 10
24;0) were expected
to be positively correlated since they are based on similar judgmental processes in this case. The
correlational pattern for the other three lotteries can be derived by applying the same reasoning.
The covariance structure (16) in combination with (17) was estimated for single subject
data. Table 1 displays the observed binary and trinary marginal probabilities as well as the
model predictions for one of the subjects and shows that (16) can capture well the dependencies
between the repeated evaluations of the lotteries (with ˆ τ = .63 (.06)) and, equally important,
it can account for the observed violations of weak stochastic transitivity. Thus, in contrast to
the standard formulation of random utility models which assume independent judgments on the
individual level and ﬁxed utilities across choice sets, (16) can represent both consistent and
inconsistent choices satisfactorily.
Tsai and B¨ ockenholt (2007) illustrate further the usefulness of distinguishing explicitly
between within- and between-judge variability based on (15) in combination with (16) in a
reanalysis of the intertemporal choice data reported by Roelofsma and Read (2000). As in the
replication of the Tversky (1969) study, (16) proved to be well-suited to account for systematic
transitivity violations which were caused in this study by inconsistent trade-offs between “time”
and “money” attributes characterizing the choice options. Extensions of the model framework
to analyze other choice anomalies are currently underway. These studies show that both the
compromise and the attraction effect can be modeled parsimoniously using the decomposition
(16) of the within-judge covariance matrix (B¨ ockenholt & Tsai, 2007).
Relaxing the assumption of ﬁxed and predetermined utilities appears to be a promising
approach to describe seemingly inconsistent choice behavior. By allowing the individual-level
utilities to vary in repeated evaluations of the same options in different choice sets, this approach
TABLE 1.
Observed and expected probabilities for RUM models with stable and
correlated utilities
Obs. Stable utilities Corr. utilities
Pr(a   b) .61 .50 .63
Pr(a   c) .47 .46 .44
Pr(a   d) .43 .50 .42
Pr(b   c) .52 .45 .50
Pr(b   d) .38 .49 .43
Pr(c   d) .58 .54 .57
Pr(a   b,b   c,c   a) .11 .12 .10
Pr(b   a,c   b,a   c) .22 .12 .21
Pr(b   c,c   d,d   b) .11 .12 .12
Pr(c   b,d   c,b   d) .20 .12 .19
a = ($20,
7
24;0);b = ($19,
8
24;0);c = ($18,
9
24;0);d = ($17,
10
24;0).626 PSYCHOMETRIKA
canaccomodateaconsiderablywiderrangeofinconsistentchoicebehaviorthanhasbeenpossible
sofar.Equallyimportant,withthisframeworkitbecomespossibletorelatetheutilities’reliability
estimatestobothcontext-andperson-speciﬁccovariateswiththeresultthatonecantestrigorously
determinants of variables and possibly inconsistent utility assessments.
Conclusion
Do people choose the options they enjoy most? There is much evidence to suggest that the
answer is negative: People do not always know what they like and their ability to forecast future
utilities of potential choices appears to be systematically biased (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). The
subsequent question about necessary and/or sufﬁcient (environmental) conditions that facilitate
utility maximization has received less attention so far. Notable exceptions include the notion of
“libertarian paternalism” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003) which sets up default options in such a way
as to help people in their utility maximization. Along the same lines, a recent large-scale study
by McFadden (2006) on choices among Medicare-approved plans demonstrates the importance
of aiding consumers in helping themselves instead of relying on their self-interest in making
optimal choices (see also Lynch & Wood, 2006).
Although behavioral research on choice behavior points convincingly to limitations of ran-
dom utility models, few would dispute the usefulness of these models in rendering parsimonious
descriptionsofhowindividualsperceiveandevaluatechoiceoptions.Becausetheyarebasedona
limited explanatory framework for how people make choices, random utility models can provide
both a parsimonious quantitative description of choice outcomes and a ﬂexible framework for
modeling individual and contextual differences in choice behavior at a particular point in time
and over time. However, generalizations of RUM results to different choice situations and options
require care and need to be based on additional validation studies. The consideration of random
response errors and unstable preferences alone is not sufﬁcient to account for deviations from
utility maximization.
There are many research opportunities on the horizon for psychometricians. Better mea-
sures and indicators of utility are needed that capture the hedonic experience associated with a
choice outcome. To infer utility from choices alone without taking into account anticipated or
experienced hedonic reactions no longer seems sufﬁcient (Kahneman, 2003). Measures of brain
activity and brain electrochemistry in combination with experimental treatments are starting to
become available to provide much needed insights on the links between choice and sensations
of pleasure and pain but statistical methods are lacking for effective analyses of these links
(Montague, King-Casas, & Cohen, 2006). The development of new measures and indicators
is facilitated further by expanding their connections to psychological concepts and processes.
For example, affective and motivational mechanisms are becoming integrated in theories of
individual choice behavior and have led to new concepts such as “irrational wanting” and “subra-
tional liking” (Winkielman & Berridge, 2003), pointing to obvious limitations in current choice
modeling frameworks. Recently, Mourali, B¨ ockenholt, and Laroche (in press) showed that the
compromise and asymmetric dominance effects can be weakened or strengthened depending
on whether a person has a promotion or prevention focus (Higgins, 1997), demonstrating that
motivational factors need to be taken into account when modeling choice data. In general, the
search for choice models that are behaviorally more realistic but still tractable is complicated
greatly by identiﬁability and endogeneity issues. Current choice models for unstable preferences,
uncertain outcomes, or social interactions suffer from difﬁculties both in separating different
sources of heterogeneity and in identifying multiple equilibria, all of which needs to be stud-
ied carefully with the help of well-designed empirical studies. Clearly, challenges for model-
ing and predicting choice behavior are abundant but they also assure the future well-being of
psychometrics.ULF B¨ OCKENHOLT 627
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